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Abstract
In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem, in which the agent
after receiving his wage contract but before undertaking the costly e¤ort
can borrow on his future wage earnings. The game between the agent
and potential lenders is modelled as an innite stochastic game with an
exogenous stopping probability. We show that the principal cannot design
a wage scheme that is robust to hedging by the agent. In particular, we
show that, if the exogenous stopping probability is non zero, the principals
wage o¤er will be followed by several rounds of borrowing by the agent.
This is compared to the recontracting-proofness equilibria which most of
the literature has concentrated on, assuming that this stopping probability
is zero. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium of the model with a
strictly positive stopping probability does not converge to the equilibrium
of the model in which it is zero. We also nd that the principals prot is
lower, the maximum wage payment can be higher and e¤ort is lower.
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1 Introduction
Robust incentives are incentives that are immune to the possibility that the
incentivized party engages in further contractual relationships to o¤set or partly
undo those incentives.
Consider the case of a rms manager. Traditional principal-agent theory
predicts that a managers wealth should be tied to rm performance to provide
incentives to the manager to maximize shareholder value. Thus, his pay is in-
dexed on rm prots or he is rewarded via shares or stock options. However,
if prots are risky and the manager is risk-averse he will prefer to hedge some
of the risk inherent in such a remuneration scheme. Selling some of his stock
holdings, for instance, will reduce his exposure to stock price movements. Since
such hedging activities break the link between rm performance and the man-
agers wealth, the use of stock awards or other incentive schemes to incentivize
managers becomes questionable.
In this paper we analyze the optimal design of incentive schemes when recon-
tracting opportunities are present and ask whether robust incentives, incentives
that will not be contracted away, exist.
Recontracting is a real life phenomenon. Many intermediaries o¤er nancial
products for corporate insiders to hedge their large exposure to their rms stock.
Among such instruments are zero-cost collars, equity swaps and loans against
stock holdings. Certainly, hedging or retrading incentive schemes is limited by,
for instance, the use of vesting periods for stock options and there are legal limits
to the possibility for executives to hedge their risk.1 Still, Bettis, Bizjak, and
Lemmon (2001) report that high ranking insiders, such as CEOs and members of
the board of directors cover an average of 36% of their share holdings with cost-
less collars. Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that managers with high ownership
shares in their company tend to sell their existing stock holdings after option
or stock awards. Similarly, borrowers can often enter into multilateral contracts
which impact on their global incentives. For instance, no legal mechanism
can completely eliminate the possibility that a debtor country contracts further
loans. A current U.S. website (www.cardweb.com) reports that the average U.S.
household with at least one credit card has 6 bank credit cards and 8.3 retail
credit cards for a total of 14.3 credit cards. Likewise, insurance contracts are
subject not only to moral hazard but also to a recontracting hazard. In fact, the
possibility that an agent retrades after entering into an insurance contract is the
rule rather than the exception.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of such recontracting opportunities
on the optimal compensation package o¤ered by a rm to its manager and on
the e¢ ciency of a managers e¤ort decision. We study a simple moral hazard
1This is not so for non-executives, see the arbitration claim led on October 28, 2003 against
CISCO, which seeks compensation damages directly related to the failure to recommend hedging
strategies to employee stock option plan participants.
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problem, similar to Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983), in which
a principal hires an agent to perform a task. After receiving his wage contract
but before undertaking a costly e¤ort, the agent can borrow on his future wage
from a competitive market. He can contract with a potentially innite number
of lenders. We model this lending game as a stochastic game with an exogenous
stopping probability, in which the agent meets lenders sequentially. With each
lender he can sign a bilateral agreement after which the game either ends or
moves to the next round of contracting. If the lending game ends the agent will
undertake the e¤ort. We characterize the essentially unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in this game for all parameter values of the exogenous stopping
probability. We distinguish between two situations, one in which this probability
is zero and one in which it is positive.
We term the situation in which the stopping probability is zero as perfect
recontracting. The following results obtain. The agent either borrows on his
entire wage allocation and exerts no e¤ort or borrows on only part of his wage,
retaining some residual future wage (and thus some incentives), such that he is
just indi¤erent between borrowing an additional amount and quitting the lending
game. We call this residual wage the recontracting-proof wage. We show that
without loss of generality the agent borrows from one lender only. Thus, there is
no reason to expect multiple contracts in equilibrium. The principals problem
of choosing an optimal wage scheme simplies to nding the recontracting-proof
wage allocation and associated e¤ort level. We conrm the ndings of several
related papers discussed below that in this model a wage that induces high e¤ort
is associated with higher risk and a higher expected payment to the agent than
the conventional second best. Also, a at wage that induces low e¤ort is chosen
more often by the principal than in the second best. Thus, this model predicts
that the principal can indeed design robust incentives, albeit at higher costs.
Our key nding is that this is no longer true when the stopping probability
is non zero, a situation which we call imperfect recontracting. Thus, the type of
equilibrium in which the agent receives a risky wage but prefers not to recontract
is not implementable. Instead, he borrows sequentially from a nite number of
lenders and stops only if he is forced to (because the recontracting game ends
for exogenous reasons) or if he has borrowed on his entire future wage. Thus,
the agent always obtains multiple loans in equilibrium and no recontracting-
proof-principleholds in a game of imperfect recontracting. This is important
empirically. Since the analysis of recontracting games is motivated by the ob-
served prevalence of recontracting, models where no recontracting takes place
fail to explain the data.
The reason why the predictions of the model of perfect recontracting di¤er
from the one of imperfect recontracting is the following. In the latter, in each
recontracting round the agent and the current lender perceive that this could be
the last opportunity for the agent to obtain a loan. Because future borrowing
imposes a negative externality on existing borrowing agreements, being the last
3
lender is valuable. Consequently, the agent will be able to secure more favorable
loans. This makes borrowing more attractive and makes a recontracting-proof
wage more di¢ cult and, as we in fact show, impossible to implement.
We then compare the outcome of the perfect recontracting model to the one
of an imperfect recontracting model that is arbitrarily close. Surprisingly, it turns
out that for a certain range of parameters, the two equilibria are distinct even if
the exogenous stopping probability tends to zero.
First, neither the agents e¤ort nor his wage payment in the equilibrium
of the imperfect recontracting model approach the e¤ort and the wage scheme
in the recontracting-proof equilibrium under perfect recontracting. Second, the
principal receives a lower payo¤ when recontracting is imperfect than when it
is perfect. Because the principals payo¤ from low e¤ort is independent of the
agents recontracting opportunities the above result also implies that low e¤ort
will be more often implemented in a world of imperfect recontracting. Third, the
number of loans obtained by the agent goes to innity as the stopping probability
in the imperfect recontracting game approaches zero, and the size of those loans
becomes vanishingly small. Thus, there is a discontinuity in the amount of
borrowing when the stopping probability is zero. Also, the wage corresponding
to high output under imperfect recontracting is far above the second-best wage
or the recontracting-proof wage under perfect recontracting, and it is innitely
costly for the principal to induce high e¤ort with probability one. Thus, very
high wage payments are more likely to be observed in a world of imperfect
recontracting, which might explain some of the abnormally high salaries paid in
recent years to CEOs and other top executives.
These last ndings are puzzling because we would have expected the equi-
libria of the two models to converge. The reason for this seeming inconsistency
is the following. To obtain the recontracting-proof equilibrium under perfect
recontracting we need to make an additional assumption about equilibrium se-
lection. This assumption is also made implicitly in all of the literature. Namely,
we assume that, although there is a potentially innite number of lenders, the
agent only contracts with N of them. This assumption can be justied by the un-
modelled possibility that there is a small cost of contracting, so that an innite
amount of contracting agreements is innitely costly. That is, an equilibrium
with an innite number of active lenders is precluded by assumption. Thus, by
assumption, the limiting equilibrium of the imperfect recontracting model with
an innite round of borrowing cannot coincide with the equilibrium of the perfect
recontracting model.2
2 In Reiche (2006) we study a model that contains both a positive cost of contracting and
an exogenous stopping probability. We show that if both the contracting cost and the stopping
probability go to zero, which of the two equilibria obtain depends on the speed with which
the two parameters approach zero. That is, for xed contracting cost, taking the stopping
probability to zero results in the equilibrium of the perfect recontracting model described above.
In contrast, for a xed stopping probability, taking the contracting cost to zero results in the
equilibrium of the imperfect recontracting model.
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The paper is related to several papers in the literature on non-exclusive
contracts, such as Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), (1999) and Kahn and Mookher-
jee (1998). The rst two papers study a moral hazard problem, in which a
wealth constraint entrepreneur can borrow sequentially from an innite number
of banks. In contrast to our paper, these two papers only consider standard debt
contracts as they do not allow the borrowing contracts to be contingent on the
output realization. Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) study an insurance problem, in
which a risk-averse agent can buy insurance sequentially from an innite num-
ber of insurers but they do not address the principals problem. In contrast to
our paper all three papers investigate the perfect recontracting case, in which
they show a recontracting-proofness-principle similar to the one explained above.
They also show that the agent can limit borrowing or buying insurance from one
bank or insurance company only.
Parlour and Rajan (2001) study an unsecured loan market, in which bor-
rowers can default strategically. In contrast to our paper and the ones above,
the lenders make all the contracting o¤ers. They show that equilibria exist, in
which lenders make positive prots. Nevertheless, default never occurs in equi-
librium and without loss of generality the agent borrows from only one lender.
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) model a problem similar to Kahn and Mookherjee
(1998) but assume that insurers simultaneously o¤er insurance contracts to the
agent. They show that positive prot equilibria can be sustained and that mul-
tiple contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium. Some of these contracts are actively
traded and some are latent. Nevertheless, they obtain allocations that are ro-
bust to further retrading, that is, equilibria in which high e¤ort is sustained
with probability one exist. In Bisin et al. (2006) the authors use this approach
to study optimal compensation packages o¤ered to managers when managers
can hedge their nancial positions but rms have an imperfect monitoring tech-
nology at their disposal to monitor and punish those hedging activities. They
show that a managers compensation is more incentivized when the monitoring
technology is costly or when nancial markets are more developed. In our paper,
we do not consider monitoring of a managers hedging activities directly, but the
exogenous stopping probability in the lending game can be seen as a proxy for
how di¢ cult it is to prevent the agent from hedging his position or how well
developed the nancial market is. In our paper, the relationship between the
quality of recontracting and incentive pay are not as clear-cut. A decrease in the
stopping probability goes hand in hand with a decrease in the optimal wage in
case of high output that induces a xed number of borrowing rounds. However,
because a decrease in the stopping probability increases the likelihood that low
e¤ort is induced in equilibrium the principal might now o¤er a more incentivized
wage in order to induce a higher number of borrowing rounds (and consequently
a higher probability of high e¤ort). Also, in Bisin et al., as in the other papers,
hedging is prevented by the optimal compensation package, so that their paper
cannot explain the ndings on insider hedging activities cited above.
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The paper is structured as follows. The following section contains the model.
Section 3 describes the agents optimal e¤ort choice. Section 4 solves for the
optimal wage contract if borrowing can be prevented. Section 5 solves for the
agents and principals equilibrium strategies when the exogenous stopping prob-
ability in the lending game is bounded away from zero. Section 6 solves for their
stragegies when this probability is zero. Section 7 compares the two equilibria
and shows that they are distinct even if the stopping probability in the rst
model tends to zero. Finally, conluding remarks are provided in section 8.
2 The Model
At date 0, a principal hires an agent to manage a production technology with
uncertain prot stream ~x. The technology allows for two possible output realiza-
tions at date 2, x > x, which are veriable and accrue directly to the principal.
At an intermediate date 1, the agent undertakes a costly and unobservable
e¤ort that a¤ects the probability distribution over output levels. He can choose
between two e¤ort levels, high e¤ort eh and low e¤ort el, where e¤ort ei results
in high output with probability pi and costs ci, i = h; l.3 We assume that high
e¤ort yields a larger expected output than low e¤ort and that it is more costly,
that is, ph > pl and ch > cl. To compensate the agent for his e¤ort cost the
principal o¤ers a compensation scheme w 2 RR2, that consist of a sign-up fee
w1 2 R and a wage w2 2 R2. The sign-up fee is paid to the agent directly after
he has been hired at date 1. The wage is paid at date 2 and can consequently
be indexed on the output realization, w2 = (w2; w2).
The agent has a utility function that is separable in date 1 and date 2 con-
sumption (money) and separable in e¤ort. He discounts future payo¤s by a
discount factor 0 <  < 1. For simplicity, we assume that he is risk-neutral and
so his utility can be written as
U(w; ei) = w1   ci + Epi [w2]; (1)
where Epi [w2] = piw2 + (1   pi)w2.4 The principal is also risk-neutral and for
simplicity, we assume that he does not discount future prots.5 The principals
expected returns can then be written as
(w; ei) =  w1 + Epi [x  w2]: (2)
3We will also sometimes write p(ei) = pi and c(ei) = ci.
4Some preliminary results were obtained for more general utility functions, in particular
when the agent is risk-averse. They are available from the author. However, it is impossible
to obtain closed form solutions with risk-aversion and it is therefore very di¢ cult to obtain
comparative static results. Note however, that, because the utility function is assumed to be
continuous, the obtained results also hold for an agent with su¢ ciently small risk aversion.
5Our results could be established with the assumption that the principal discounts the future
as well. All we need is that his discount factor is higher han the agents.
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To motivate the assumptions about the parties di¤ering time preferences
consider the following examples. Assume, that at date 1 the agent has the
possibility to invest I into a project that returns R > I at date 2. Assume
further that only he can make this investment. For instance, to be successful the
project needs the agents personal input as well as his capital. Then, the agent
has preferences as in (1) with  = IR < 1 and the principal has preferences as
in (2). Alternatively, assume that the agent has some nancial needs at date 1
that are not covered by the up-front fee received as part of his wage package.
Assume in contrast that the principal has almost unlimited funds. If there are
credit market imperfections, the rate r1 at which the agent can borrow money is
likely to be higher than the rate r2 at which the principal can place his. Then,
by setting  = 1+r21+r1 < 1, we obtain the above preferences.
We assume that the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er to the
agent. If the agent rejects the o¤er both parties receive their reservation utilities
which we normalize to 0: We also assume that the agent has no initial wealth
and is protected by limited liability. He can therefore not receive a negative
wage. Furthermore, the wage cannot be made directly contingent on his e¤ort,
because e¤ort is unobservable. In addition, it cannot include other prescriptions,
for example it cannot forbid the agent to enter into another contract with a third
party. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that the agent can secretly solicit
nancing from outsiders at date 1, that is, after he has signed the employment
contract but before the underlying uncertainty is resolved. Importantly, he can
do so before he undertakes the e¤ort. This game is described in the next section.
2.1 The Lending Game
The fact that the agent discounts his future wage payments at a rate  < 1
suggests that there are gains from trade when he exchanges part of his future
earnings against an up-front payment from a lender.
We assume that there is an innite number of risk neutral lenders whom
the agent meets sequentially. In contrast to the initial stage game in which the
principal o¤ers the wage contract, we assume that in the lending game the agent
makes all contracting o¤ers. This can be justied by assuming that both the
nancial market and the labor market are perfectly competitive. Thus, lenders
earn zero prots and the agent, when being o¤ered employment, is kept at his
reservation utility.
A contract with a lender consists of an up-front payment t1 2 R that is paid
at date 1 by the lender to the agent, and a payment t2 2 R2, also from the
lender to the agent, that is contingent on the realization of uncertainty at date
2. Thus, t2 = (t2; t2), where t2 (respectively t2) is the payment made in case of
high (respectively low) output. After each stage of the lending game, with an
exogenously given probability q < 1 the agent will be able to contract with an
additional lender, and with probability 1 q he will not meet another lender and
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has to undertake the e¤ort.6 The lending subgame is also terminated if the agent
voluntarily decides to solicit no further contracts. This modelling assumption has
two advantages. First, we do not need to worry about the possibility that the
lending subgame does not end. In Kahn and Mookherjee (1998), the authors
address this problem by assuming that the agents utility is equal to negative
innity if he enters into an innite number of contracts. They motivate this
assumption with reference to contracting cost: If each contract involves a small
cost an innite round of contracting is innitely costly. Second, the assumption
of an exogenous end to the lending game allows us to study the dynamics of the
recontracting game. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the lending game
will end due to some exogenous factors, which are outside the partiescontrol.
Consider again the motivating example in the Introduction of a manager who
wants to hedge the risk inherent in his remuneration package. It is plausible that
the CEO of a large company cannot consecrate an unlimited amount of time to
design an optimal portfolio, that is, he might be forced to stop searching for a
further lender even if there are still gains from trade.
A lenders expected prots depend on the contract he has signed and the
odds on output resulting from the agents e¤ort choice. We again assume for
simplicity that each lender is risk neutral and does not discount future payo¤s.
Thus, we can write a lenders expected prots as
V (t; ei) =  t1   Epi [t2]: (3)
Neither the initial employment contract nor any of the insurance or loan
contracts depend on any consecutive contract that the agent may sign. In other
words, we do not consider universal mechanisms as dened in Epstein and Pe-
ters (1999) and Peters (2001), where a principals contract may depend on the
contract that the agent writes with another principal. One way to justify this
restriction is to assume that it is impossible for the principal to foresee all po-
tential ways in which the agent can obtain nancing after he has been employed.
Furthermore, it is implausible that an employment contract can prohibit, or be
made contingent on the possibility that a third party related to the agent ob-
tains a nancial position in the rms stock. For example, assume that a CEOs
remuneration package consists partly of stock options. He could instruct some
member of his family to purchase put options on the rms stock, which would
undo the incentive e¤ects of the remuneration scheme if the two partieswealths
are interdependent.
Finally, it is assumed that a lender observes the agents wage scheme and all
previously signed contracts and therefore knows the agents total wage allocation
when they meet. Thus, we abstract from all informational problems.
6This probability also applies to the rst stage, that is, the probability that the agent enters
into the lending game is q.
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2.2 Timing
To summarize the timing:
  Date 0 : The principal o¤ers a wage contract w to the agent at date 0. The
agent accepts or rejects. If he rejects, the game ends and both parties receive a
utility of 0. If he accepts we move to date 1.
  Date 1 : The principal pays the sign-up fee w1 to the agent.
Lending Game: The agent meets a lender with probability q. With probabil-
ity 1 q he does not meet a lender and the game moves to the e¤ort subgame. If
the agent meets a lender he can either decide not to request a loan and choose his
e¤ort directly or he can ask for a loan contract t. The lender can either accept
or reject the demand. If he accepts he pays the up-front fee t1. Then, the above
described stage game is repeated.
E¤ort Subgame: The agent undertakes e¤ort ei 2 feh; elg.
  Date 2: Output is realized. The agent is paid a wage w2 or w2 by the
principal depending on the realization of output and receives t2 or t2 from each
lender with whom he has signed a contract.7
2.3 Equilibria
We rst describe the agents strategy set in the lending game. Since a lender
is a short-lived player who cares only about his payo¤, we can neglect history
dependent strategies for the agent and assume without loss of generality that the
agents strategy is stationary, that is, only depends on his current total allocation
!. For that, dene 
 := R  R2. An element ! = (!1; !2; !2) 2 
 consists of
the agents total wealth !1 at date 1, which includes the up-front payment made
by the principal and all payments made by preceding lenders, and the promised
date 2 payments !2 = (!2; !2); which include the promised wage by the principal
and the promised repayments to and from lenders. To simplify on notation we
can formulate the agents decision not to request a loan as o¤ering a contract
t = (0; 0; 0). Then, the function  : 
  ! 
 fully describes the agents strategy,
where (!) is the agents newwage, that is, (!) ! is the contract o¤ered to
the lender. For instance, if (!) = !, the agent o¤ers t = (0; 0; 0) at !.
The agents strategy in the e¤ort game is a function e : 
 7! fel; ehg.
Finally, when the agent is o¤ered an employment contract by the principal
he can either accept or reject. He will always accept the initial wage contract if it
provides him with an expected utility of at least zero. Without loss of generality
it is therefore assumed that the principals initial o¤er w fullls this constraint.
Thus, the agents overall strategy is ((); e()). The agents expected utility
from an initial allocation !, following strategy ((); e()) can be written as
EU(!; ; e) = (1  q)
X1
n=0
qnU(n(!); e(n(!)));
7For each recontractor t might di¤er.
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where n(!) =   :::  | {z }
n
(!) and 0(!) = !. Similarly, dene the expected
probability of high output as
(!; ; e) = (1  q)
X1
n=0
qnp(e(n(!))):
To understand these two expressions, observe that with probability (1   q)qn
the lending game is terminated at allocation n(!) and the agent chooses e¤ort
e(n(!)).
A lenders strategy in the lending game is a decision a 2 f0; 1g; where a = 0
(a = 1) signies that the lender rejects (accepts) the contract (!)   !. Since
he only cares about his one period payo¤, he always accepts a contract that
allows him to break-even given the agents strategy in the lending game and
the associated probabilities of high and low output. Thus, if the agent is at
allocation ! and follows strategy ((); e()); the lender will set a = 1 if and only
if V ((!)   !; ((!); ; e))  0: Since one possible contract that satises this
constraint is the null contract, we can without loss of generality assume that the
agent o¤ers a contract (!)  ! that allows the lender to break even.
We can now dene the equilibrium concept of Subgame Perfection in this
context.
Denition 1 A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is a tuple (w; (); e()), where
w maximizes
 w1 + E(w)[x  w2] s.t. EU(w; ; e)  0; (4)
() maximizes
EU ((!); ; e)) 8! 2 

s.t
V ((!)  !; ((!)))  0 8! 2 

(!)  0 8! 2 
;
(5)
and e(!) maximizes U(!; e) for all ! with (!) := (!; ; e):
Line (4) is the principals maximization problem, where his expected prots
are calculated using (w), that is, taking into account the agents equilibrium
strategy (; e); and where he has to guarantee the agents participation. Line
(5) describes the agents maximization problem in the lending game. At every
!; (!) must be optimal given that he employs his subgame perfect strategy
() in every other state. Two constrains must be satised in this maximization
problem. Lenders must break even and contracts must fulll the agents limited
liability constraint.
Before providing a characterization of the subgame perfect equilibria we make
some assumptions about the agents behavior when he is indi¤erent between
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several strategies. As is standard in the principal-agent literature, it is assumed
that the agent, when indi¤erent between two e¤ort levels, will choose the e¤ort
level preferred by the principal. We expand this idea by assuming that whenever
the agent is indi¤erent between two contract proposals to a lender he will o¤er
the contract that induces an equilibrium path with maximum expected e¤ort.
Formally:
Assumption 1: Ties will be broken as follows
1. e(!) = eh if U(!; eh) = U(!; el)
2. Assume that both () and 0() are part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Then, if (!; ; e)  (!; 0; e) set (!) := (!).
3 Optimal E¤ort
The agent will choose e = eh if and only if U(w; eh)  U(w; el); or equivalently
!2  c
p
+ !2; (6)
where c = ch   cl and p = ph   pl: Thus, the agents optimal e¤ort choice
at allocation ! is independent of !1. Set IC :=
n
! 2 
 j !2  cp + !2
o
, and
:IC := 
 n IC. With a slight abuse of notation, we will also sometimes set
IC :=

!2 2 R2 j ! 2 IC
	
and :IC := R2 n IC. Then the agents equilibrium
strategy is
e(!) =
(
eh () ! 2 IC
el () ! 2 :IC:
(7)
In the following section we solve the contacting problem between the principal
and the agent when there are no borrowing possibilities. We show that if the
principal o¤ers an employment contract that induces the agent to exert high
e¤ort, the agent has an incentive to acquire liquidity from a lender. Thus, the
possibility of the agents borrowing constitutes a real constraint for the principal.
4 Benchmark: No Borrowing
Assume that the agent cannot borrow on his date 2 wage. To induce low e¤ort,
the principal pays an up-front payment just large enough to cover the e¤ort cost
and pays nothing at date 2. Thus, he sets w1 = cl and w2 = (0; 0). This is
optimal since it is costly to defer paying the agent ( < 1) and the date 2 wage
is benecial only for providing incentives.
In contrast, if the principal wants to induce high e¤ort he should choose
w 2 IC. To maximize the principals payo¤ (2) the inequality in (6) must hold
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with equality and therefore:
w2 =
c
p
+ w2: (8)
Because deferring payment to the agent is costly, it is optimal to set
w2 = 0: (9)
Finally, the agents participation and limited liability constraints allow to solve
for the up-front fee:
w1 = max

phcl   plch
p
; 0

.
Assume, that it is optimal for the principal to induce high e¤ort in the second
best and also assume that the agents limited liability constraint is not binding.8
Assumption 2:
wsb =

0;
c
p
; 0

(10)
We now show that with the second-best compensation scheme the agent strictly
prefers to borrow against his date 2 wage. First, note that at the second-
best wage the agent is indi¤erent between choosing high or low e¤ort, that is,
U(wsb; eh) = U(w
sb; el). Second, if he borrows against his entire future wage
earnings, the lender, foreseeing that the agent will put in low e¤ort, is willing to
pay up to Epl [w
sb
2 ]. Thus, the agent receives Epl [w
sb
2 ]  cl > U(wsb; el); because
 < 1, and we have shown the following.
Proposition 1 The second-best wage contract is vulnerable to borrowing, that
is, the agent strictly prefers to borrow on his entire date 2 wage in exchange for
a date 1 payment. He then chooses low e¤ort.
5 Borrowing: The case q < 1
We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium when the agent can borrow
from an innite sequence of lenders. In all of the following we will use the agents
optimal e¤ort choice e() as derived in section 3.
We rst solve for the up-front payment that a lender pays to the agent as a
function of the second period borrowing agreement. Obviously, it is optimal for
the agent to keep a lender at his reservation utility. Thus, the up-front payment
is going to be equal to the fraction of the expected second period wage that
the agent promises to the lender. This expectation is calculated using the odds
induced by the agents equilibrium strategy. Formally,
8 If it is optimal to induce low e¤ort in the seond best, recontracting is not an issue. Assuming
that the agents limited liability constraint is not binding is without loss of generality. It saves
on notations because we can set w1 = 0 in what follows.
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Lemma 1 For all !,
(!)1   !1 = E((!))[!2   (!)2]:
Proof. see Appendix.
Lemma 1 xes the rst part of the agents equilibrium strategy. We will
now discuss an intuitive way of nding ()2, the second part of his equilibrium
strategy. Most formal statements and proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Note, that with every strategy ()2 is associated a unique second period wage
path !2 ! (!)2 ! ((!))2 ! ::: in R2. Therefore, we will sometimes use
the expression that a strategy traces a wage pathor has an associated wage
pathor equivalently that it is induced by a wage path. We will call a wage
path feasibleif the associated strategy is feasible, that is, if it fullls the agents
limited liability and the lendersbreak-even constraints.
5.1 The :IC region
The equilibrium strategy within the :IC region is straightforward. The agent
optimally pledges his entire date 2 wage against an up-front payment from a
single lender. We call this strategy 1(). Thus, 1() has associated wage path
!2 ! !02 with
!02 = 0 and !
0
2 = 0: (11)
Its optimality in :IC is proved formally in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. Here,
we try to give some intuition and outline the steps of the proof. First, it is easy
to see that the agent should never voluntarily quit the lending game with a non
zero date 2 wage !2 2 :IC. This is worth Epl [!2], but he can obtain Epl [!2]
as an up-front payment from any lender. Second, borrowing from more than
one lender within the :IC region is strictly dominated by borrowing from only
one. This is because the agent obtains the same odds (pl) from both lenders
but risks not meeting the second one and being left with some positive residual
date 2 wage. Finally, one can show that exchanging a residual wage inside the
:IC region against one inside the IC region is also not optimal: First, Lemma
2 in the Appendix shows that a strategy with an associated wage path that
contains a jump from the :IC into the IC region (or vice versa) must then have
the agent quit the lending game. To see this, assume to the contrary that the
associated path contains the sequence !2 ! (!)2 ! ((!))2 with !2 2 :IC,
(!)2 2 IC and (!)2 6= ((!))2. Then it is easy to show that substituting for
this the sequence !2 ! ((!))2 is feasible and better for the agent. Using this
result Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows that exchanging a wage allocation inside
the :IC region against one inside the IC region and then quitting the lending
game to undertake high e¤ort is dominated by borrowing against the entire wage
allocation and undertaking low e¤ort.
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5.2 The IC region
Here we develop the equilibrium strategy within the IC region. Take an alloca-
tion !2 2 IC. Obviously, the agent can follow the same strategy as in the :IC
region and exchange his entire date 2 wage against an up-front payment. But
this is not always optimal. One other possible strategy, call it 0(), is not to
borrow at all and undertake high e¤ort. This strategy yields a payo¤:
Eph [!2]  ch; (12)
whereas 1() yields
(1  q)(Eph [!2]  ch) + q(Epl [!2]  cl): (13)
It is possible that (12) is larger than (13). A necessary condition for this is
ph > pl. A variant of 0(), we call s(), can perform even better. With s()
the agent exchanges only part of his date 2 wage against an up-front payment,
e¤ectively retaining a residual wage !s2 2 IC. He then quits the lending game.
This strategy traces the path !2 ! !s2 ! !s2 ! :::: It results in utility
(1  q)(Eph [!2]  ch) + q(Eph [!2   !s2] + Eph [!s2]  ch): (14)
Note that the lender uses ph to calculate the up-front payment because the agent
exerts high e¤ort for sure.
What other strategies could be optimal? The agent can for example decide
to borrow from two lenders. This strategy is called 2() and looks as follows.
With the rst lender the agent exchanges part of his date 2 wage against an
up-front payment, keeping some residual wage !12 2 IC. With the second lender
he borrows against the entire remainder of his wage. Compared with the rst
strategy this strategy has a costand a benet. It is costly for the agent to
use this strategy because with positive probability he will not meet the second
lender and will be left with the residual wage !12, which is discounted at  < 1.
The benet is that since !12 2 IC; the agent undertakes high e¤ort with some
probability (precisely in the case where he does not meet the second lender) and
this in turn implies that he receives a better deal from the rst lender. In fact,
the rst lender uses 2 = (1   q)ph + qpl to calculate the up-front payment (in
Lemma 1) which is greater than pl. Thus, the agent obtains utility
(1  q)(Eph [!2]  ch)+ q(E2 [!2 !12]+ (1  q)(Eph [!12]  ch)+ q(Epl [!12]  cl))
(15)
Comparing (15) and (13), depending on !2 and !12, strategy 2() might perform
better than strategy 1().
Finally, consider extensions to n > 2 lenders. We call such strategies n(),
n = 3; 4; :::. With the rst lender the agent exchanges part of his date 2 wage
against an up-front payment and retains a residual wage !n 12 2 IC; with the
second lender he exchanges another part of his wage and retains a residual wage
14
!n 22 2 IC and so on until the last lender, from whom he borrows against his
entire remaining wage. For a given set of allocations f!i2gi=1;:::;n 1 2 IC, this
strategy is uniquely dened by its associated wage path: !2 ! !n 12 ! !n 22 !
::: ! !12 ! !02. Borrowing from more lenders increases the risk of not meeting
all of them and thus increases the cost of not being able to borrow against the
entire date 2 wage. At the same time it increases the benet of obtaining better
borrowing deals from early lenders. For example, with n lenders, the rst one
will estimate the probability of high output at
n = (1  qn 1)ph + qn 1pl (16)
and is consequently willing to pay a relatively high up-front transfer.
Thus, our candidate equilibrium strategies inside the IC region are the strate-
gies fn()gn and s() with correctly specied allocations f!n2gn 2 IC and
!s2 2 IC.9 Two properties of those allocations are relatively easy to establish.
Property 1
!n2 = 0 8n and !s2 = 0:
Property 1 says that after each round of borrowing the residual date 2 wage
must pay nothing in case of low output. Intuitively, retaining some positive date
2 wage is only valuable for the agent if it allows him to credibly promise high
e¤ort. This will in turn allow him to obtain better borrowing conditions from
lenders, who will receive most of their repayments in the high output state. Put
di¤erently, without an incentive problem the agent would strictly prefer to receive
all of his remuneration at date 1. Therefore, payments in case of low output,
which dilute e¤ort incentives and are costly to the agent, should optimally be
set equal to zero.
Property 2
!n2 > !
n 1
2 8n:
Property 2 says that after each round of contracting the agent is left with a
smaller residual date 2 wage, that is, he borrows in equilibrium. The intuition is
as above: Because !2 is in IC the odds with which future borrowing risk will be
evaluated are una¤ected by a contract that increases the agents residual wage
in case of high output. Therefore, an increase in this wage only imposes a cost on
the agent. The two properties are proved formally in Lemma 5 in the Appendix.
It remains to determine the exact locations of the allocations f!n2gn>1 and
!s2 on the vertical axis. Two conditions must be met. First, for strategy n()
to be credible it must be optimal for the agent to use strategies fi()gi<n at
allocations f!i2gi<n. Second, for strategy n() to be optimal, the allocations
f!i2gi<n must be the allocations with minimal expected value in IC that satisfy
9This is proved formally in Lemma 4 in the appendix.
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the rst condition. Similarly, for strategy s() to be credible, strategy 0()
must be optimal at !s2 and !
s
2 must be the allocation with minimal expected
value in IC that satises this condition.
This suggests the following recursive method for dening the allocations
f!n2gn>1 and !s2: !12 is found by setting !12 = 0 and solving
EU(!1; !
1
2; 0; eh) = EU(!1; !
1
2; 0; el), (17)
that is, !12 is the second best wage that induces high e¤ort. As was shown in
section 4, strategy 1() is optimal at !12 and it is also the allocation with the
smallest expected value in the IC region.
Given !12, strategy 2() is dened as the strategy inducing wage path !2 !
!12 ! !02. From !12 move upwards on the vertical axis, that is, increase !2. Using
(15) we see that 2()s payo¤ increases by (1 q)ph+q2, whereas 1()s payo¤
increases by (1  q)ph + qpl (see (13)). Since 2 > pl, the marginal increase in
strategy 2()s payo¤ from an increase in !2 is larger than the marginal increase
in strategy 1()s payo¤. Thus, there exists an allocation !22 on the vertical axis
with !22 > !
1
2, at which strategies 2() and 1() yield the same payo¤. We can
calculate this allocation explicitly by equating (15) and (13) and setting !22 = 0:
!22 =
(1  )pl
p2
c+ !12: (18)
Everywhere above !22 on the vertical axis strategy 2() dominates 1(), and
everywhere below 1() dominates 2(). From Property 2 and its discussion it
should be clear that on the latter section 1() also dominates all strategies n()
with n > 2.10 It remains to evaluate strategy 0()s payo¤ to see whether it is
possible to nd an allocation !1s2 on the vertical axis between !
1
2 and !
2
2, where
0() is optimal. This would make strategy s() credible. To do this we proceed
as before. We know that at !12 strategy 1() yields a higher payo¤ than 0().
Then, moving upwards from !12 on the vertical axis, 0()s payo¤ increases by ph
(see (12)), whereas 1()s payo¤ increases by (1 q)ph+qpl. If ph  pl; there is
never an allocation at which 0() dominates 1(). Assume the contrary. Then,
0()s payo¤ increases faster than 1()s payo¤ and we can nd an allocation,
such that everywhere above it 0() dominates and everywhere below it 1()
dominates. This allocation, call it !1s2 , can be calculated by equating (13) and
(12) and setting !1s2 = 0, which yields
!1s2 =
1
ph   plc: (19)
Comparing (18) and (19), it is easy to see that !1s2 > !
2
2 and so we have shown
that 1() is the agents subgame perfect equilibrium strategy on the vertical
axis below allocation !22. We can extend this argument to nd the entire subset
of the IC region on which 1() is optimal: 
1 = f! 2 IC j !12  !2 < !22g.
10More precisely, this follows from the proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix.
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Using an inductive argument we can nd the remaining allocations f!n2gn>2,
strategies fn()gn>2 and the subsets of the IC region on which the latter con-
stitute the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. We can also establish that
strategy s() is never credible, that is, 0() never dominates the bestn().
Before stating the result formally, we provide the explicit solutions for the resid-
ual wage payments in case of high output for n > 2:
!n2 =
(1  )plc
2p
n 2X
i=1

(1  )ph
q(i+1)=2p
i
+ !22: (20)
The following proposition contains the formal description of the agents sub-
game perfect equilibrium in the lending game:
Proposition 2 The agents subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the lending
game is as follows:
(!) :=
(
1(!) for all ! 2 :IC
n(!) for all ! 2 
n
(21)
with 
n = f! 2 IC j !n2  !2 < !n+12 g, 1  n.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 in the Appendix illustrates the subgame perfect equilibrium. Several
conclusions can be drawn from Proposition 2. First, recontracting is an equilib-
rium phenomenon. Contrary to most results in the literature (for example, Bizer
and DeMarzo (1992), (1999) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998)), the principal
cannot prevent the agent from requesting and receiving subsequent nancing by
choosing an appropriate wage allocation. Instead, the agent will always choose
to borrow from a nite number of lenders.
The intuition for this can be seen as follows. In order for 0() to be a credible
strategy at some allocation !2, it must dominate the beststrategy n(). In
particular, at this wage the agent must have the following preferencerelation
over borrowing strategies:
0(!2)  n(!2)  n+1(!2): (22)
However, this implies that also a combination of the strategies 0() and n(),
lets call this strategy ^n+1(), must dominate n+1(). Playing ^n+1() means
that the agent signs the null contract with the rst lender, that is, he plays
strategy 0() with the rst lender, and plays according to strategy n() with
all subsequent lenders. We write with a slight abuse of notation
^n+1(!2) = (1  q)0(!2) + qn(!2): (23)
From (22) and (23) follows
^n+1(!2)  n+1(!2): (24)
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It is easy to see that this cannot be true, since the two strategies are indentical
starting with the second lender but n+1() has the advantage that part of the
payment in !2 is brought forward because the agent borrows on part of his wage
from the rst lender.
Second, the more incentivized the initial wage allocation the higher the in-
cidence of borrowing in equilibrium and also, the higher the likelihood of high
equilibrium e¤ort. Thus, the principal when choosing the optimal incentive
scheme trades o¤ large rewards in case of high output against high equilibrium
e¤ort. We formally solve the principals problem (4) in the next section. In sec-
tion 7 we will compare the result on recontracting found here with the equilibria
usually exhibited in other papers in the literature.
5.3 The Principals Problem
Following the analysis in the preceding section, a wage w 2 
n induces the agent
to play strategy n(), which leads to an expected e¤ort en = (1  qn)eh + qnel,
where e0 = el and e1 = eh. Consequently, similar to the analysis in Grossman
and Hart (1986) the principals problem can be divided into two parts. First, for
each e¤ort level en the principal chooses a wage wn 2 
n that induces this e¤ort
and minimizes his expected wage payments. Second, the principal maximizes his
expected payo¤ over n.
Trivially, the wage that induces e0 is w0 = (cl; !02), see Section 4. For n  1,
the principal solves
min
w2
n
w1 + En+1 [w2] s.t. EU(w; n; e
)  0: (25)
It is very easy to show that the date 2 wage schemes solving (25) are the
allocations f!n2gn. Because of Assumption 2, wn1 = 0 for all n  1.
Then, the principal solves
max
~n
E~n+1 [x  !~n2 ]: (26)
and we have
Proposition 3 For all q < 1, the principal will set a wage wn, where n solves
(26).
6 Borrowing: The Case q = 1.
All earlier models of moral hazard with recontracting (see for instance, Kahn and
Mookherjee (1998), Bizer and DeMarzo (1992)) only consider the special case of
perfect recontracting, that is, the situation where the agent meets subsequent
lenders with probability 1. Since we would like to compare our results with the
ones derived in these papers, we need to solve for the equilibrium in our model
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when recontracting is perfect, that is, when q is equal to 1. Under this assumption
it is possible for the agent to enter into an innite number of lending agreements.
As this is impracticable in reality, the literature usually focuses on equilibria that
involve only a nite number of lenders.11 One way to justify this restriction is to
assume that the agents utility from an innite series of transactions is equal to
 1. For instance, if each transaction imposes a small cost on the agent, signing
an innite number of contracts becomes prohibitively costly. Alternatively, one
can assume that the agent has only a limited amount of time to allocate between
di¤erent tasks. Therefore, spending all of it soliciting funds will leave him with
no time to consecrate on the job for which he has been hired. Consequently, no
output will be realized and the principal will pay a zero wage. Anticipating this
outcome, lenders are only willing to sign the null contract and this is a trivial
equilibrium. In the following discussion we therefore follow the literature and
exclude innite subgame perfect equilibria. This assumption will turn out to be
less innocent than previously suggested.
Turning to the analysis of the lending game for q = 1, it is easy to see that
in contrast to the setting with q < 1, the agent does not need to borrow from
more than one lender in equilibrium. Assume to the contrary that he borrows
sequentially from two sources. Because the agent meets the second lender with
probability 1, the rst lender will o¤er exactly the same loan as the second lender.
Thus, the agent could achieve the same allocation by borrowing the total amount
from only one lender.
Then, there are only two situations to consider. The agent either immediately
borrows against his entire wage (strategy 1()) and exerts low e¤ort, or he
borrows against only part of his wage, retaining an amount !s2 2 IC (strategy
s()), and then undertakes high e¤ort. The rst strategy is optimal in :IC and
in 
1 := f! 2 IC j !12  !2 < !1s2 g and the latter is optimal in 
s := f! 2
IC j !1s2  !2g; where !1s2 is as in (19). For this wage to be well dened we
need
Assumption 3:
ph > pl:
For the remainder of the paper we will assume that Assumption 3 holds. Figure
2 in the Appendix illustrates this discussion.
The rst strategy leads to low e¤ort in equilibrium and the principal imple-
ments this e¤ort optimally by setting the date 2 wage equal to !02. The agent
does not borrow in equilibrium. If the principal wants to induce high e¤ort he
needs to set a wage in 
s. The wage in 
s that minimizes his expected wage
payments is !s2. Remark, that again at this wage no borrowing occurs in equi-
librium. Thus, the principals overall problem reduces to a third-best problem,
in which to the usual incentive and participation constraints is added a recon-
tracting proofness constraint. To ease comparison with the limiting equilibrium
11Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) acknowledge this restriction, but most papers neglect to do
so.
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that will be derived in the following section we will call the equilibrium wage
and e¤ort if q = 1, w2(1) and e(1) respectively. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium is characterized by either an incentivized wage
and high e¤ort or by a at wage and low e¤ort, that is, either w2(1) = !s2 and
e(1) = eh, or w2(1) = !02 and e(1) = el: There is no borrowing in equilibrium.
7 Comparative Statics
The aim of this section is to investigate whether the equilibrium described in
Propositions 2 and 3 for q smaller than 1 converges to the equilibrium described
in Proposition 4. Surprisingly, it turns out not to be the case.
7.1 The limiting equilibrium
To denote the dependency of the equilibrium described in Propositions 2 and 3 on
q, let n(q) be the optimal amount of lenders solved for in (26) and w2(q) = !
n(q)
2
the corresponding date 2 wage. Call the e¤ort induced by this wage e(q) =
(1  qn(q))eh + qn(q)el.
The rst step is to see whether the number of active lenders n(q) remains
nite when q approaches 1. From the denition of e(q) it is immediate that if
n(q) remains nite, equilibrium e¤ort will approach el. But then, the principal
is better o¤ inducing no borrowing at all by setting the date 2 wage equal to !02.
The next step is to see what happens if the number of active lenders goes to
innity when q approaches 1. If n(q) converges more quickly to innity than q
goes to 1, limq!1 qn(q) = 0 and consequently limq!1 e(q) = eh. But then consider
the expression derived for the high wage payment !n2 in (20)
!n2 =
(1  )plc
2p
n 2X
i=1

(1  )ph
q(i+1)=2p
i
+ !22: (27)
From (27), if limq!1 qn(q) = 0 then w2(q) = !
n(q)
2 must tend to innity.
Surely, this cannot be optimal for the principal. In fact, we must have for q
su¢ ciently close to 1
(1  )ph
q(n(q) 1)=2p
 1;
which puts a strictly positive lower bound on limq!1 qn(q):
lim
q!1
qn(q)  (1  )
2p2h
2p
:
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We can show that this inequality must be satised with equality (see proof of the
following proposition), which implies that the wage for high output approaches
!12 =
(1  )plc
2p
lim
q!1
logq

(1 )2p2h
2p

 2X
i=1

(1  )ph
q(i+1)=2p
i
+ !22: (28)
Set !12 = (!12 ; 0). This discussion is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 The limiting equilibrium for q tending to 1 is characterized by
either an incentivized wage and an intermediate e¤ort level or by a at wage
and a low e¤ort level, that is, either limq!1w2(q) = !12 and limq!1 e(q) = (1 
)eh + el with  =
(1 )2p2h
2p
; or limq!1w2(q) = !02 and limq!1 e(q) = el. In the
rst type of equilibrium the number of potential recontracting rounds approaches
innity at a rate logq

(1 )2p2h
2p

  2. In the second type of equilibrium there is
no recontracting.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now turn to a comparison between the equilibrium for q = 1 and the
limiting equilibrium for q tending to 1.
7.2 Comparing the two equilibria
Assume rst that w2(1) = !s2 and e(1) = eh. Remark that we can write (19) as
!s2 =
(1  )plc
2p
1X
i=1

(1  )ph
p
i
+ !22: (29)
Therefore, since the last element in the series in (28) converges to 1, whereas the
last element in (29) is (1 )php < 1, we have
!12 > !
s
2.
From this we obtain two results.
First, if w2(1) = !s2 and e(1) = eh the limiting equilibrium of the model
with imperfect recontracting can be of the rst type described in Proposition 5.
Then, the limit wage is higher and more incentivized, e¤ort is lower and total
surplus and the principals payo¤ are lower than in the equilibrium with perfect
recontracting. Moreover, the agent is better o¤ with imperfect recontracting.
This is so, because he is paid a higher wage and can always mimic his equilib-
rium behavior under perfect recontracting, namely recontract with no-one and
undertake high e¤ort. He must therefore obtain a higher payo¤ by following his
actual equilibrium strategy.
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Second, since the principals payo¤ is lower when he pays an incentivized
wage in a world of imperfect recontracting, it is possible that he foregoes incen-
tives altogether and pays a at wage. Thus, even if in the model with perfect
recontracting the equilibrium is characterized by an incentivized wage, the lim-
iting equilibrium of the model with imperfect recontracting can contain a at
wage as in the second type of equilibrium described in Proposition 5. Conse-
quently, the limit wage is lower and less incentivized, e¤ort, total surplus and
the principals and the agents payo¤ are lower. Summarizing, in neither case
does the equilibrium for q < 1 converge to the one for q = 1.
Assume second that w2(1) = !02 and e(1) = el. Then, it is easy to verify that
the limiting equilibrium of the model with imperfect recontracting coincides with
this equilibrium. We summarize our discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Assume that the equilibrium of the model with perfect recon-
tracting contains an incentivized wage. Then this equilibrium will di¤er from the
limiting equilibrium of the model with imperfect recontracting. The latter will ei-
ther contain a higher powered incentive scheme, lower e¤ort and a non-negligible
amount of borrowing or a at wage, the minimum e¤ort and no borrowing. If
the equilibrium of the model of perfect recontracting is characterized by a at
wage, it will coincide with the limiting equilibrium of the model with imperfect
recontracting.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model in which sequential borrowing impacts
on an agents incentive to undertake a costly e¤ort. We have studied the prin-
cipals problem of designing an optimal incentive scheme for the agent if such
borrowing opportunities are present and have shown that in contrast to existing
results in the literature, the principal cannot design an incentive scheme that is
immune to borrowing. This model is therefore able to explain the large evidence
of recontracting (borrowing from multiple lenders, hedging of nancial positions
by corporate insiders etc.) in the real world. We have also shown that the perfect
(q = 1) and imperfect (q < 1) recontracting model deliver distinct results even if
we take the parameter measuring the imperfection to 1. Furthermore, we have
shown that the incidence of borrowing and the bonus payments for high output
are higher, the better developed are capital markets (the higher is q).
There are two ways in which this research can be extended. First, it is
interesting to study a model of recontracting with transaction costs that nests
the two models of perfect and imperfect recontracting studied in this paper, see
Reiche (2006). It is possible to reconcile the two equilibrium results in such a
bigger model and derive additional comparative statics results. In particular, the
new models framework can be used to study the impact of both a change in the
quality of recontracting and the size of transaction costs on payo¤s and overall
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welfare. This can then be used to answer normative questions on the optimal
quality of recontracting that parties would like to see in place. It is possible to
derive (potentially) testable conclusions about the link between the quality of
recontracting and the occurrence of recontracting and its e¤ect on wages. Such
questions on the optimal amount of recontracting can not be asked meaningfully
in any of the earlier models of perfect recontracting since as shown in Proposition
4 recontracting does not happen in equilibrium.
Second, we make many simplifying assumptions on the way in which the
agent interacts with the credit market. First, we assume that all lenders ob-
serve earlier contracts. Second, lending agreements are bilateral and are priced
optimally, that is, taking into account all subsequent borrowing by the agent.
This way of modelling is quite distinct from the conditions in real world nan-
cial markets in which the agent together with a large number of other investors
anonymously trades nancial contracts and in which market makers price these
contracts keeping in mind that there are insiders among their customers.
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9 Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1) Trivially, if (!)1   !1 < E(!;;e)[!2   (!)2], the entre-
preneur can ask for a higher up-front payment, which is accepted by the lender,
and otherwise follow the same strategy. If (!)1   !1 > E(!;;e)[!2   (!)2],
the contractor will reject. The agent is as well o¤ if he o¤ers the null contract.
Lemma 2 If () is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy and either (i)
! 2 IC and (!) 2 :IC, or (ii) ! 2 :IC and (!) 2 IC, then i(!)  (!)
for all i  1.
Proof. We use several steps.
1. Assume that strategy () leads to the following wage path in R2::: !
!2 ! !02 ! !002 ! :::, where !2 6= !02 6= !002. Then, either of the following must
be true:
a. !02 2 :IC and !2   !02  !2   !02
b. !02 2 IC and !2   !02  !2   !02:
Proof by contradiction. Assume otherwise. We show that the path ::: !
!2 ! !002 ! ::: is feasible and better than ::: ! !2 ! !02 ! !002 ! :::. To
save on notation, set  = ((!1; !2); ; e). Dene 0 and 00 similarly. From
Lemma 1 we know that up-front payments for the moves from !2 to !02 and !02
to !002 are t01 = E0 [!2   !02] and t001 = E00 [!02   !002] respectively. Then, path
:::! !2 ! !02 ! !002 ! ::: feasible requires
!1 + t
0
1  0 (30)
!1 + t
0
1 + t
00
1  0; (31)
where !1 is the total amount of money that the agent has available at allocation
!. Feasibility of the path :::! !2 ! !002 ! ::: requires
!1 + E00 [!2   !002]  0:
It is easy to see that if !0 2 :IC (!0 2 IC); then 00  0 (00  0). Therefore if
neither (a) nor (b) hold,
(00   0)(!2   !02   (!2   !02))  0:
This is equivalent to
E00 [!2   !02]  E0 [!2   !02]; (32)
and therefore
!1 + E00 [!2   !002] = !1 + E00 [!2   !02] + E00 [!02   !002]
 !1 + t01 + t001 (33)
 0; (34)
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where (33) follows from (32) and (34) follows from (31). So, the path :::! !2 !
!002 ! ::: is feasible as well.
We now show that it is actually preferred. Denote by U the utility of remain-
ing at !2 (dene U 0 and U 00 similarly), that is,
U = !1 + Ep(e(!))[!2]  c(e(!)) (35)
Denote by U the utility of the path starting at !2 (dene U 0 and U 00 similarly),
that is,
U = EU(!1; !2; ; e
) (36)
Then, we can write the rst paths payo¤ as
!1 + (1  q) U + q(t01 + (1  q) U 0 + q(t001 + U 00))
and the second paths payo¤ as
!1 + (1  q) U + q(E00 [!2   !002] + U 00):
So, the second path is preferred to the rst if
E00 [!2   !002] + U 00  t01 + (1  q) U 0 + q(t001 + U 00):
Since ::: ! !2 ! !02 ! !002 ! ::: is assumed to be part of an equilibrium the
move !02 ! !002 must be weakly better than staying at !02, that is,
t001 + U
00  U 0: (37)
Therefore,
E00 [!2   !002] + U 00  t01 + t001 + U 00 (38)
 t01 + (1  q) U 0 + q(t001 + U 00): (39)
2. Assume that strategy () leads to the wage path :::! !2 ! !02 ! !002 !
:::, where either !2 2 IC and !02 2 :IC or !2 2 :IC and !02 2 IC. That
is, either !2   !02 > !2   !02 or !2   !02 < !2   !02. Then, 1a. or 1b. imply
that !002 = !0002 . By reiterating the argument in 1. it follows that also all the
subsequent allocations must be equal to !002.
Lemma 3 At ! 2 :IC the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy traces the wage
path !2 ! !02.
Proof. Assume ! 2 :IC. First, take any strategy () that satises Lemma 1
and for which i(!) 2 :IC for all i. The expected utility from such a strategy
is
!1   cl + Epl [!2]  (1  q)(1  )
1X
i=0
qiEpl [
i(!)2];
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Clearly, the strategy () that traces the wage path !2 ! !02 (i.e. i(!)  !02
for all i) is optimal among those strategies.
We nalize the argument by showing that (!) 2 IC cannot be optimal.
From Lemma 2 it follows that then i(!)2  !s2 2 IC for all i. For this to be an
equilibrium strategy staying at !s2 must be credible. In particular, staying at !
s
2
must be at least as good as moving to !02, that is,
Eph [!
s
2]  ch  Epl [!s2]  cl: (40)
But then at !, () is (weakly) preferred by the agent over (), that is,
Epl [!2]  cl  Eph [!2   !s2] + Eph [!s2]  ch: (41)
Inequality (41) follows from the following two observations. Since ! 2 :IC,
Eph [!2]  ch < Epl [!2]  cl: (42)
This implies that (41) is true if
Eph [!2]  Epl [!2]  Eph [!s2]:
But (40) and (42) together imply that
(Eph [!2]  Epl [!2]) < Eph [!s2]  Epl [!s2];
which proves the result.
Lemma 4 At ! 2 IC the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy traces either of
the following wage paths:
1. !2 ! !n 12 ! !n 22 ! ::: ! !12 ! !02 for some n 2 N and appropriately
dened allocations f!i2gi=1;:::;n 1 2 IC.
2. !2 ! !s2 for some appropriately dened !s2 2 IC.
Proof.
1. This follows trivially from combining Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
2. Take a strategy that satises Lemma 1 and for which i(!) 2 IC for all i.
The expected utility from this strategy is
!1   ch + Eph [!2]  (1  q)(1  )
1X
i=0
qiEph [
i(!)2]:
If this strategy is to be part of an equilibrium the allocations i(!)2 must
all have the same expected value Eph [
i(!)2]. Assume otherwise, that
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is, assume that there exists a k with Eph [
k(!)2] > Eph [
i(!)2] for all
i 6= k. Then, it is easy to construct an argument as in Lemma 2, that
shows that an equilibrium with a path that leaves out k(!)2, that is,
::: ! k 1(!)2 ! k+1(!)2 ! :::, is both feasible and preferred by the
agent. It then follows that, since at each i(!)2 it is (weakly) optimal
to move to i+1(!)2; at each i(!)2 it is also (weakly) optimal to stay at
i(!)2, since the path i(!)2 ! i+1(!)2 ! i+2(!)2 ! :::yields utility
!i1   ch + Eph [i(!)2]  (1  q)(1  )
1X
j=i
qj iEph [
j(!)2]
= !i1   ch + Eph [i(!)2]  Eph [i(!)2](1  q)(1  )
1X
j=0
qj
= !i1   ch + Eph [i(!)2];
where !i1 is the accumulated date 1 payments at 
i(!) and the nal line
represents the utility from staying at i(!)2.
Lemma 5 The allocations f!n2gn must be such that !n2 = 0 and !n2  !n 12 for
all n. Similarly, !s2 = 0.
Proof. First, we show that !n2 = 0 for all n. Assume that there is an allocation
!n2 such that !
n
2 > 0. Then we will show that the wage path :::! !n+12 ! !n2 !
!n 12 ! :::! !12 ! !02 is dominated by the path :::! !0n+12 ! !0n2 ! !0n 12 !
::: ! !012 ! !002 , where !0n2 = !n2   !n2 , !0n2 = 0 and !0k2 = !k2 for all k 6= n. A
similar argument can be used to show that !s2 = 0.
We rst need to show that the latter path is feasible.
A lender who takes the agent from !n+12 to !
n
2 (or !
0n+1
2 to !
0n
2 ) evaluates the
probability of high output at n+1 = (1 qn)ph+qnpl. The lender who takes the
agent from !n2 to !
n 1
2 (or !
0n
2 to !
0n 1
2 ) evaluates it at n. The corresponding
up-front payments (see also Lemma 1) are
tn1 = En+1 [!
n+1
2   !n2 ]
t0n1 = En+1 [!
0n+1
2   !0n2 ] = tn1 + !n2
tn 11 = En [!
n
2   !n 12 ]
t0n 11 = En [!
0n
2   !0n 12 ] = tn 11   !n2 :
The path :::! !n+12 ! !n2 ! !n 12 ! :::: feasible requires
!n+11 + t
n
1  0 (43)
!n+11 + t
n
1 + t
n 1
1  0; (44)
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where !n+11 is the total amount of money that the agent has available at alloca-
tion !n+1. Feasibility of the path :::! !0n+12 ! !0n2 ! !0n 12 ! ::: requires
!n+11 + t
0n
1  0 (45)
!n+11 + t
0n
1 + t
0n 1
1  0: (46)
(45) follows from (43) and the expression derived above for t0n1 , and (46) follows
from (44) and the expressions derived for t0n1 and t
0n 1
1 .
We now show that path :::! !0n+12 ! !0n2 ! !0n 12 ! ::: is preferred.
Denote by Un+1 the utility of remaining at !n+12 (dene U
n and Un 1 simi-
larly) and denote by Un+1 the utility of the path starting at !n+12 when following
the assumed wage path (dene Un and Un 1 similarly).12 The rst path yields
utility
!n+11 + (1  q) Un+1 + q(tn1 + (1  q) Un + q(tn 11 + Un 1)): (47)
The second path yields utility
!n+11 + (1  q) Un+1 + q(t0n1 + (1  q) U 0n + q(t0n 11 + Un 1): (48)
So, the second path is preferred to the rst if
t0n1 + (1  q) U 0n + qt0n 11  tn1 + (1  q) Un + qtn 11 : (49)
or equivalently if
t0n1   tn1 + q(t0n 11   tn 11 )  (1  q)!n2 :
Substituting the expressions we have derived for the up-front payments this
inequality becomes
(1  q)!n2  (1  q)!n2 ;
which is satised for all   1.
Second, we show that for a wage path !2 ! !n 12 ! !n 22 ! :::! !12 ! !02
to be optimal, we must have !2  !n 12 . Setting !2 = !n2 proves the second part
of the Lemmas statement. Assume the contrary. Then we show that the wage
path !2 ! !0n 12 ! !0n 22 ! ::: ! !012 ! !002 dominates the rst path, where
!0n 12 = !2 and !
0k
2 = !
k
2 for all k 6= n  1
From the rst part of this lemma, we know that !n2 = 0 for all n. The up-
front payments for the rst and second lender respectively in the two wage paths
can be calculated as in the rst part of this proof using Lemma 1:
tn 11 = En [!2   !n 12 ]
t0n 11 = 0
tn 21 = En 1 [!
n 1
2   !n 22 ]
t0n 21 = En 1 [!2   !n 22 ]
12See also the formal denitions in (35) and (36).
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The path !2 ! !n 12 ! !n 22 ! :::: feasible requires
!1 + t
n 1
1 + t
n 2
1  0: (50)
The path !2 ! !0n 12 ! !0n 22 ! ::: feasible requires
!1 + t
0n 1
1 + t
0n 2
1  0: (51)
By using the expressions derived above for the up-front payments (51) will follow
from (50) if
n 1(!2   !n 12 )  n(!2   !n 12 ); (52)
But (52) is true since n 1  n and !2  !2 < !n 12 by assumption.
We now show that the path !2 ! !0n 12 ! !0n 22 ! ::: is preferred.
This is true if the expected utility derived from the second path is larger than
the expected utility derived from the rst part, i.e. if
(1 q)(ph!2+(1 ph)!2)+q(t0n 21 +Un 2)  tn 11 +(1 q)ph!n 12 +q(tn 21 +Un 2):
Again, by replacing the expressions for the up-front payments, this is equivalent
to:
(1  q)(ph(!2   !n 12 ) + !2)  (1  q)(ph(!2   !n 12 ) + !2);
which is satised for all   1.
Before proving Proposition 2 we derive a useful simplication of EU(!; n; e),
for n  1 and ! 2 IC. To save on notation, we set !1 = 0. For a given set of
allocations f!i2gi=1;:::;n 1 and assuming that the agent follows strategy n(), we
can, compute the cumulative up-front payments that the agent will have received
after i rounds of recontracting, 1  i  n, using Lemma 1:
!n i1 (!; n) = En [!2   !n 12 ] +
i 1X
j=1
En j 1 [!
n j
2   !n j 12 ]: (53)
In what follows, we will simplify notation by setting !n i := (!n i1 (!; n); !
n i
2 ).
Then,
EU(!; n; e
) = (1  q)U (!; e(!)) + (1  q)
n 1X
i=1
qiU
 
!n i; e(!n i)

(54)
+qnU
 
!0; e(!0)

= qEn [!2   !n 12 ] +
n 1X
i=1
qi+1En i [!
n i
2   !n i 12 ] (55)
+(1  q)(Eph [!2]  ch)) + (1  q)
n 1X
i=1
qi(Eph [!
n i
2 ]  ch))  qncl
= qEn [!2] + (1  q)Eph [!2]  (1  q)(1  )
n 1X
i=1
qiEph [!
n i
2 ] (56)
 ((1  qn)ch + qncl);
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where (55) follows from (53) and (56) follows from
qEn i [!
n i
2 ] En i+1 [!n i2 ]+(1 q)Eph [!n i2 ] =  (1 q)(1 )Eph [!n i2 ]: (57)
We now provide the proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. (Proposition 2) The proof is via induction. We show that for any n we
have
1n The allocations f!i2gi=0;:::;n are dened by
EU((!1; !
i
2); i; e
) = EU((!1; !i2); i 1; e
);
and for 2  i  n
!i2 =
(1  )i 1pi 2h pl
q(i 1)(i 2)=2pi
c+ !i 12 : (58)
2n Strategy i, 1  i  n  1, is optimal on the vertical axis between !i2 and
!i+12 .
3n Strategy n is the optimal strategy at !n2 .
4n Strategy n dominates i, 1  i  n  1, on the vertical axis above !n2 .
5n If
n := ph   n > 0,
the allocations f!is2 gi=1;:::;n dened by !is2 = 0 and
EU((!1; !
is
2 ); i; e
) = EU((!1; !is2 ); 0; e
)
are well dened and for 2  i  n
!is2 =
qi 1p
i
(1  )i 1pi 2h pl
q(i 1)(i 2)=2pi
c+ !i 12 : (59)
We have shown most of the Inductive Hypothesis for n = 2 in the discussion
preceding Proposition 2. It remains to prove 5n for n = 2. The argument
proceeds similarly to the one that shows how to obtain !1s2 . Since, it will be
provided below for general n, we wont repeat it here and just note that by
equating (12) and (15) we obtain,
Eph [!
2s
2 ]  ch = E2 [!2s2   !12] + (1  q)(Eph [!12]  ch) + q(Epl [!12]  cl)
,
2!
2s
2 = ((1  q)ph   2 + qpl)!12 + qc
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Therefore, only if 2 > 0 is !2s2 well dened and is given by
!2s2 =
q(1  )pl
2p
c+ !12: (60)
We now show the Inductive Step, namely that if 1n  5n are true for some n,
then 1n+1 5n+1 are also true. We proceed exactly as in the discussion preceding
Proposition 2:
Given !n2 , strategy n+1() is dened as the strategy inducing wage path
!2 ! !n2 ! ::: ! !12 ! !02. Then, since n() is optimal at !n2 we know that it
must yield a higher payo¤ than n+1(). Then, from !n2 move upwards on the
vertical axis, i.e. increase !2. Using (56) we see that n+1()s payo¤ increases
by (1 q)ph+qn+1, whereas n()s payo¤ increases by (1 q)ph+qn. Since
n+1 > n, the marginal increase in strategy n+1()s payo¤ from an increase
in !2 is larger than the marginal increase in strategy n()s payo¤. Thus, there
exists an allocation !n+12 on the vertical axis with !
n+1
2 > !
n
2 , at which strategies
n+1() and n() yield the same payo¤. Everywhere above !n+12 on the vertical
axis strategy n+1() dominates n(). This proves 4n+1 since by the Inductive
Hypothesis 4n, n() dominates all i() with 1  i  n  1.
We now write (58) for 2  i  n as
!i2 =
(1  )plc
2p
i 2X
j=1

(1  )ph
q(j+1)=2p
j
+ !22.
and show that (58) also holds for i = n+ 1. Using (56), !n+12 is dened by
q(n+1   n)!n+12 = (1  q)(1  )ph
nX
i=1
qi(!n+1 i2   !n i2 ) + (1  q)qnc
()
!n+12 =
(1 )ph
qnp
Pn 1
i=1 q
i

(1 )n ipn i 1h pl
q(n i)(n i 1)=2pn+1 ic

+ (1 )pl
p2
c+ !12
(61)
=
Pn 1
i=1
(1 )n+1 ipn ih pl
q(n+1 i)(n i)=2pn+2 ic
+ (1 )pl
p2
c+ !12
(62)
=
(1  )npn 1h pl
qn)(n 1)=2pn+1
c+ !n2 (63)
where (61) follows from the denition of !n i2 for i = 2; :::; n and
q(n+1   n) = (1  q)qnp:
The second line (62) follows from
qi
qnq(n i)(n i 1)=2
=
1
q(n+1 i)(n i)=2
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and (63) again uses the denition of !n i2 for i = 2; :::; n. This concludes 1n+1.
Consider now the section of the vertical axis between !n2 and !
n+1
2 . From
the above discussion we know that n() dominates n+1() on this section of
the vertical axis. By the Inductive Hypothesis 4n, n() dominates all i(),
i < n and Property 2 and the proof of Lemma 5 imply that it also dominates
all strategies i(), i > n+ 1. To show that it is indeed the optimal strategy on
this section we need to show that !ns2 , the allocation at which strategies 0()
and n() yield the same payo¤, lies above !n+12 , i.e. we need to show that
!n+12 < !
ns
2 . This would imply that strategy 0() is not optimal on the vertical
axis between !n2 and !
n+1
2 and that consequently strategy s() is not credible
on this section. Therefore, n() is the subgame perfect strategy on the vertical
axis between !n2 and !
n+1
2 .
We obtain the expression for !ns2 from (59) for i = n, which is true by the
Inductive Hypothesis. Then, using (63), !n+12 < !
ns
2 is equivalent to
(1  )npn 1h pl
qn(n 1)=2pn+1
c+ !n2 <
qn 1p
n
(1  )n 1pn 2h pl
q(n 1)(n 2)=2pn
c+ !n 12 :
Using (58) for i = n, is in turn equivalent to
(1  )npn 1h pl
qn(n 1)=2pn+1
c+
(1  )n 1pn 2h pl
q(n 1)(n 2)=2pn
c <
qn 1p
n
(1  )n 1pn 2h pl
q(n 1)(n 2)=2pn
c:
Since n = ph   n, this is equivalent to
 (1  )2p2h < 0;
which is trivially true. This concludes 2n+1.
3n+1 now follows easily since from 2n+1 we know that n() is optimal on
the vertical axis between !n2 and !
n+1
2 , and !
n+1
2 is dened as the allocation at
which n() and n+1() yield the same payo¤. Therefore, n+1() is optimal at
!n+12 .
The last step is to show 5n+1. We proceed as before. We know that at !n+12
strategy n+1() is optimal and therefore yields a higher payo¤ than 0(). Then,
moving upwards from !n+12 on the vertical axis, 0()s payo¤ increases by ph
(see (12)), whereas n+1()s payo¤ increases by (1 q)ph+qn+1. If ph  n+1;
i.e. n+1  0; there is never an allocation at which 0() dominates n+1(). If on
the other hand n+1 > 0, 0()s payo¤ increases faster than n+1()s payo¤, and
we can nd an allocation !n+1s2 , such that everywhere above it 0() dominates
and everywhere below it n+1() dominates. Note, that since 1 > 2 > ::: > n+1
we know that if n+1 > 0, also i > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. Therefore, if n+1 > 0,
by the Inductive Hypothesis, (59) holds for all i = 1; :::; n.
We now want to show that it also holds for n + 1. For this, it is rst useful
to note that by equating (56) and (12) we get for all j:
j!
js
2 =  (1  q)(1  )ph
j 2X
k=0
qk!j k 12 + q
j 1c: (64)
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Therefore,
n+1!
n+1s
2 =  (1  q)(1  )ph
n 1X
k=0
qk!n k 12 + q
nc (65)
=  (1  q)(1  )ph!n2 + qn!ns2 (66)
=  (1  q)(1  )ph!n2 (67)
+q
 
n!
n 1
2 + q
n 1p
(1  )n 1pn 2h pl
q(n 1)(n 2)=2pn
!
=  (1  q)(1  )ph!n2 + qnp!n2   q(1  )ph!n 12 (68)
= n+1!
n
2 + q
(1  )npn 1h pl
q(n 1)(n 2)=2pn
(69)
where (65) and (66) follow from (64) for j = n + 1; n, (67) follows from the
Inductive Hypothesis, and (68) and (69) both follow from (58) for i = n; n   1
and n+1 = ph   n+1. The expression (59) for n+ 1 then follows because
q
q(n 1)(n 2)=2
=
qn
qn(n 2)=2
:
This proves 5n+1:
Claim 2n for all n describes the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy on
the vertical axis in IC. To extend this to the entire IC region, the same proof
is repeated (including the discussion preceding Proposition 2, which proves the
Inductive Hypothesis) by xing !2 and then starting the proof at the boundary
with the :IC region, i.e. at (!12 + !2; !2).
Proof. (Proposition 5)
We need to prove the remaining claim, namely that  := limq!1 qn(q) =
(1 )2p2h
2p
. Assume to the contrary that the equilibrium for all q < 1 is charac-
terized by a wage w(q) = (0; w(q); 0) and a corresponding number of lenders
n(q) (i.e. w(q) = !n(q)2 (q)), such that  = limq!1 q
n(q) >
(1 )2p2h
2p
. Then,
we want to show that for all q su¢ ciently close to 1, the principal can prof-
itably deviate from this equilibrium by o¤ering a more incentivized wage w0(q)
with w0(q) = !n
0(q)
2 (q) > w(q) and by inducing a higher number of lenders
n0(q) > n(q). For this choose n0(q) such that 0 := lim q!1qn
0(q)  (1 )2p2h
2p
. Since
n0(q) > n(q) we know that qn0(q) < qn(q) and consequently 0 = lim q!1qn
0(q) < .
To show that this is indeed a protable deviation for the principal we show
that it raises his payo¤. Reconsider the principals maximization problem in (26).
By making the simplifying assumption13 w1(q) = 0, we can write his payo¤ for
13This does not a¤ect the results.
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all q < 1 as a function of the chosen high wage !n2 (q):
n(q) = n+1(x  !n2 (q)) + (1  n+1)x
= x+ n+1(x  !n2 (q))
= x+ (ph   qnp)(x  !n2 (q)): (70)
The deviation increases the rst bracket in (70) since it increases the probability
of high e¤ort and thus the probability of high output and it decreases the second
bracket in (70) since the principal pays a higher wage in case of high output.
We argue that the second e¤ect can be made arbitrarily small while keeping the
rst e¤ect bounded away from 0 for all q su¢ ciently close to 1.
We can write the di¤erence in the principals payo¤ when inducing n0(q) as
opposed to n(q) recontracting agreements as
n
0(q)(q) n(q)(q) = (qn0(q)p  ph)(!n
0(q)
2 (q)  !n(q)2 (q))
+(qn(q)   qn0(q))p(x  !n(q)2 (q)):
The second term on the right-hand-side of this expression is positive and stays
bounded away from zero when q approaches 1, since x   !n(q)2 (q) > 0 for all
q (a necessary condition for !n(q)2 (q) to be the equilibrium wage) and q
n(q)  
qn
0(q) approaches    0 > 0. The rst term on the right-hand-side is negative,
since !n
0(q)
2 (q) > !
n(q)
2 (q) and q
n0(q)p  ph < 0 (necessary for n0(q)(q) to be a
protable deviation, see (70)). We show that it can be made arbitrarily small.
To see this, note rst that the rst bracket remains bounded by 0p  ph: The
second bracket can be written as follows (see (27)):
!
n0(q)
2 (q)  !n(q)2 (q) =
(1  )plc
2p
n0(q) 2X
i=n(q) 1

(1  )ph
q(i+1)=2p
i
: (71)
Since by denition lim q!1qn
0(q) = 0, there must exist a neighborhood around
q = 1, such that for all q < 1 in this neighborhood the sum in (71) is bounded
from above by
(1  )plc
2p
n0(q) 2X
i=n(q) 1

(1  )ph
0p
i
=
(1  )plc
2p

(1 )ph
0p
n(q) 1    (1 )ph0p n0(q) 1
1  (1 )ph0p
For q tending to 1, the denominator of this expression tends to 0, whereas the
numerator is xed and lies between 0 and 1, which proves that (71) can be made
arbitrarily small.
Finally, since this argument can be applied to any n(q) with limq!1 qn(q) >
(1 )2p2h
2p
, we conclude that in equilibrium  = limq!1 qn(q) =
(1 )2p2h
2p
.
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